Washington Eyes Expanded NATO Nuclear-Sharing Pact as France Builds Competing Deterrence Network

The U.S. is in confidential talks to extend NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission to Poland and the Baltic states — a move accelerated by France’s rival deterrence initiative that has already drawn nine European allies

The United States is in confidential talks to expand NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement to Poland and the Baltic states, the Financial Times reported Tuesday, as France’s rival European deterrence initiative draws growing allied support.

Three people briefed on the discussions told the newspaper the talks concern a possible extension of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft, or DCA, mission — under which allied nations host forward-deployed U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs and fly certified aircraft capable of delivering them. No agreement is imminent, two of the sources said, adding the discussions are intended to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to maintaining a credible nuclear umbrella over NATO allies.

Six NATO allies currently participate in the DCA mission — Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and, in an arrangement taking shape, the United Kingdom — with approximately 100 U.S. B61 nuclear warheads stored across five of those nations.

France’s Initiative Forces Washington’s Hand

The impetus for the U.S. discussions traces directly to a speech French President Emmanuel Macron delivered March 2, 2026, at the Île Longue submarine base in Brittany — the most substantial shift in French nuclear doctrine in decades.

Macron proposed that allied nations participate in deterrence discussions and exercises and potentially host French Rafale B fighters capable of carrying nuclear weapons during a crisis, with France retaining sole authority over any nuclear strike. He also announced France would increase its warhead stockpile beyond the current estimated 290, the first announced expansion since at least 1992, and said Paris would no longer disclose specific warhead counts going forward.

Eight countries entered Macron’s “dissuasion avancée,” or advanced deterrence, framework immediately: Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Norway became the ninth on May 27, 2026, when Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre visited Paris. The two nations also signed a mutual defence agreement, including a provision that participants “may host French strategic air forces” under the initiative.

The French framework carries a structural advantage over the U.S.-led model: it does not require partner nations to procure or certify specific aircraft. France would deploy its own Rafale B fighters armed with the ASMP-A, a supersonic nuclear cruise missile with a range exceeding 310 miles (500 kilometers) and a speed above Mach 3. The nuclear trigger and the delivery platform both remain entirely French.

By offering deterrence participation without an aircraft procurement mandate, the initiative gives allied nations a route to nuclear reassurance that does not automatically run through the F-35 program.

The F-35A and the DCA Requirement

The F-35A is today the only dual-capable aircraft in production for NATO’s nuclear-sharing role. The older F-16 and Panavia Tornado platforms used in legacy DCA configurations cannot interface electronically with the B61-12, the only U.S. tactical nuclear weapon currently in production.

Germany’s experience illustrates what DCA participation requires. Berlin considered certifying the Eurofighter Typhoon to replace its aging Tornado nuclear-delivery fleet, but the combined certification timeline and Tornado retirement schedule risked a capability gap. Germany selected the F-35A instead, placing a firm order for 35 aircraft.

The German defense ministry confirmed: “The decision on the Tornado successor has been made: With the F-35 aircraft type, the task of nuclear sharing will be guaranteed in the future.”

The Netherlands has received initial certification for the deterrence mission for its F-35As. The United Kingdom announced the acquisition of at least 12 F-35A aircraft for the DCA mission; U.K. Defense Minister Luke Pollard confirmed that “the nuclear weapons allocated to that mission are US assets held in US custody and under US control.”

Poland Pursues Both Tracks

Poland occupies the most strategically significant position in the expansion debate. Before Macron’s March speech, Warsaw had shown the strongest interest among non-sharing NATO allies in joining the U.S. nuclear-sharing arrangement as a host nation.

In March 2025, then-President Andrzej Duda explicitly called for U.S. nuclear weapons to be stationed on Polish soil, telling the Financial Times: “The borders of NATO moved east in 1999, so twenty-six years later there should also be a shift of the NATO infrastructure east. I think it’s not only that the time has come, but that it would be safer if [nuclear] weapons were already here.”

Duda simultaneously described U.S. nuclear sharing and French deterrence cooperation as “neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive” — reflecting Warsaw’s position as a nation that entered Macron’s framework immediately while pursuing the U.S. DCA path.

Poland’s first three F-35A Husarz fighters arrived at the 32nd Tactical Air Base at Łask on May 22, 2026, ferried from Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth production facility via Lajes Air Base in the Azores, making Poland the first NATO eastern-flank operator of a fifth-generation combat aircraft. Poland is acquiring 32 F-35As total under a $4.6 billion contract; full operational readiness is expected in 2027.

Baltic States and Finland

The Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — were among the nations that expressed interest in hosting DCA bases, the Financial Times reported. All three were absent from Macron’s initial list of framework partners, described at the time as following the debate closely.

Finland presents a legally distinct case. On March 5, 2026, the Finnish government announced plans to amend the country’s 1987 Nuclear Energy Act, which currently prohibits the import, manufacture, possession, and detonation of nuclear explosives on Finnish territory. Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen said the change was needed for Finland to “fully exercise its role inside NATO’s deterrence and collective defense system.” Finnish President Alexander Stubb has stressed Finland does not intend to host nuclear weapons in peacetime, though removing the legal prohibition would allow a future government to make a different decision.

The Finnish Parliament subsequently ruled that the existing defence cooperation agreement with the United States would not automatically authorize nuclear weapon imports under the amendment.

Washington’s Strategic Calculus

If the discussions move forward, the Financial Times reported, the result could be a more flexible version of nuclear sharing — closer in structure to France’s forward deterrence concept — under which U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft could operate from allied soil without an immediate host-nation aircraft procurement requirement.

Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby said in February 2026 that the United States would continue to provide its “extended nuclear deterrent” while pressing European allies to assume primary responsibility for their conventional defense. The Trump administration has simultaneously announced plans to shrink the pool of U.S. conventional military forces available to NATO during a crisis, Defense News reported.

Colby has stated Washington would “strenuously oppose” any European ally seeking to develop an independent nuclear program in violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations — underscoring that any expanded nuclear reassurance, whether through France’s initiative or a broader U.S. pact, is designed to close the security gap without enabling independent proliferation.