The “Kamikaze” of the Luftwaffe Assault Groups

They were tasked with keeping the skies of the Third Reich free of “Flying Fortresses”

On that sunny late morning of April 5, 1945, the sky thundered above the Salzwedel railway junction. Forty “Flying Fortresses” of the Eighth Air Force, arranged in three perfect “boxes,” cruised at 23,000 feet. Not a burst of flak or any German fighters were in sight. Nothing seemed capable of stopping the B-17s from pulverizing their target. In the tail turret of one of these aircraft, Sergeant Urban R. Joffrey watched the smoke markers fall on the station when he was suddenly dazzled by the sun’s reflection on a B-17’s wing. Joffrey looked up at the sky. A tiny black dot had just appeared at six o’clock, 3,300 feet above the American formation. The escort fighters hadn’t reacted and the radio remained silent. Yet the dot was approaching at high speed, and its silhouette soon revealed its identity: a Focke-Wulf Fw 190! When the Focke-Wulf was only 2,000 feet away, Joffrey released the safety on his weapons and opened fire, instantly followed by the other gunners in the box. Thirteen hundred feet, 1,000 feet, 650 feet… Completely surrounded by tracers, the Focke-Wulf still didn’t fire. The roar of the BMW engine grew louder and louder, finally drowned out by a tremendous explosion. The German fighter had just collided with the last “Flying Fortress.” All that remained of the two aircraft was a shower of debris.

Much later, during the debriefing, intelligence officers listened with intense interest to Sergeant Urban R. Joffrey’s report. To them, this attack could only have been the act of a desperate madman or a fanatical Nazi. Such tactics, worthy of the Japanese, were uncommon in Europe, and this spectacular incident would appear to have no consequences. And yet! At the airfields of Stendal, Delitzsch, Märtitz, and Gardelegen, approximately 180 suicide fighters from the “Elbe” special unit were waiting for the next raid by the Eighth Air Force.

In January 1943, the U.S. Eighth Air Force, based in England, launched its first strategic raids on German soil. On the 27th of that month, the city and port of Wilhelmshaven received the first visit from the B-17s. The destruction caused that day was negligible, as was the German defense’s reaction. However, the air battle for the Reich had begun and would soon eclipse anything the belligerents had experienced since the start of the conflict in scale and duration.

At the beginning of 1943, the balance of power was already uneven. The Luftwaffe entered this battle with laughable numbers compared to the forces arrayed against it. Against the 250 day fighters assigned to defend the Reich, the Eighth Air Force fielded more than 500 four-engine B-17s and B-24s, a number that would continue to grow over the following months. The fighting intensified during the summer, resulting in undeniable success for the Luftwaffe. The P-47 Thunderbolts providing escort did not yet have sufficient range to accompany the four-engine bombers to central Germany, a shortcoming the Americans quickly remedied. The B-17 proved to be an exceptional adversary, “on a par with the Luftwaffe,” as Hermann Göring was forced to admit a few months later. The B-17 posed an almost insurmountable problem for German fighters, which bristled with additional heavy-caliber weapons that were often effective but dangerously reduced their performance.

On August 17, the Eighth Air Force mounted a large-scale raid on the Schweinfurt industrial complex. Against all odds, the outcome was disastrous for the attackers: 40 B-17s were destroyed and over 100 were damaged, compared to German losses of no more than 25 aircraft! Despite this, American incursions became increasingly frequent. Formations of around 50 aircraft were quickly replaced by huge waves of 500 heavily escorted four-engine bombers. The slow suffocation of the Nazi war industry had begun, and the anxious Luftwaffe recalled fighter groups from various fronts to strengthen its defensive potential.

In August 1943, JG 3 was entirely assigned to defend the Reich, increasing the number of fighter wings in the West to five. JG 2 and 26 were stationed in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, while JG 1, 3, and 11 were stationed in Germany. On October 14, the Eighth Air Force returned to Schweinfurt to suffer an even more crushing defeat. Sixty-two of the “Flying Fortresses” sent that day were shot down; 17 others crashed on their return; and the survivors returned with varying degrees of damage. The Luftwaffe managed to deploy 350 twin-engine fighters and destroyers, paying for its success with 35 aircraft. However, the giant factory’s production fell by 50%, and it would take six months to return to normal.

The situation was becoming serious for the Luftwaffe high command, and the first cold spells of winter brought no respite from the American offensive. Some fighter groups were also beginning to show clear signs of fatigue. There was no real solution in sight to the problem of American and British strategic bombing, and Germany was slowly turning into a gigantic field of ruins.

THE BIRTH OF THE ASSAULT GROUPS

At the end of December 1943, General Galland met with one of his close associates, Major Hans Günther von Kornatzki, for a momentous meeting. Von Kornatzki proposed reorganizing the Reich’s air defense by equipping it with elite squadrons that specialized in fighting four-engine aircraft and used new combat methods. Experience had shown that a single Messerschmitt Bf 109 attacking a “box” of 15 B-17s was targeted by at least 40 gunners, leaving it with little chance of completing its pass intact.

According to von Kornatzki, the only way to remedy this was to saturate the defensive fire. A frontal attack carried out by a Gruppe of 30 aircraft with perfect cohesion would disorganize the barrage and render it almost harmless. Thus, nothing would prevent the fighters from maximizing their attack. The psychological effect would cause panic and lead to the breakup of the four-engine “box.” To increase the attackers’ chances of success, they would install a system of armor to protect the cockpit and engine. The fighters’ armament would also have to be reinforced to include at least two 30mm cannons.

The Sturmjäger (assault fighters) positioned on the front line would open fire at 1,000 feet from the bombers and break away on the radio order of the formation leader a few seconds before collision. In conclusion, von Kornatzki proposed to Galland that he immediately form an experimental assault squadron that von Kornatzki would command himself.

Galland had been presented with numerous theories about strategic raids, most of which were as radical as they were delusional, but none had interested him to this extent. Von Kornatzki’s seriousness and the logic of his presentation convinced Galland to accept.

Von Kornatzki was one of the first officers in the secret Luftwaffe of the 1930s. In 1934, he belonged to the famous Reklamestaffel Mitteldeutschland, renamed Jagdgeschwader “Richthofen” on March 16, 1935. By June 1940, he was one of the most senior German fighter pilots, commanding E/JG 52. After the French campaign ended, he was withdrawn from operations and became an instructor at JFS 1 in Werneuchen, then a member of the fighter command staff. Despite his age, he left with about 15 volunteers for a base in southern France.

The Sturmstaffel 1 trials began in January 1944 using standard Focke-Wulf 190 A-6 aircraft. Initially, training consisted of numerous attacks carried out with a gun camera on a placid Fw 200 “Condor” that tirelessly flew along the Rhône valley. However, due to its slowness, the “Condor” was quickly deemed inadequate. It was decided that, for greater realism, the aircraft would be armed, and testing would continue against the four-engine aircraft of the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force.

There were a few encounters with Liberators and Flying Fortresses, enabling Sturmstaffel 1 to complete its training. The Focke-Wulfs were unarmored, and the pilots were reluctant to press their attacks. By the end of winter, von Kornatzki was satisfied that the experiment had been sufficient, and Sturmstaffel 1 returned to Germany. A complete report on the composition, use, and equipment of future assault groups was sent to the fighter command. Things would now move quickly.

In April, the Focke-Wulf corporation in Bremen received specifications for converting the Fw 190 A-8, which had been rolling off assembly lines since late March, into an assault fighter. The company responded quickly because the Rüstsatz R2 field conversion kit had been in existence since July 1943 (tested on the Fw 190 V 51, Werk-Nr. 530 765). The assault fighter was born.

The assault fighter enters service

In early May 1944, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe ordered the formation of the first assault group. After a brief consultation with unit commanders, the IVe Gruppe of JG 3 “Udet” was chosen. It was one of the most effective units defending the Reich. The unit’s successes were largely due to the tactical innovations introduced by its energetic Gruppenkommandeur.

Fw 190 A-8s from IV/JG 3 were converted into assault fighters by adapting the Rüstsatz R2 at the end of the month, and training was accelerated. Two types of attack were chosen:

Head-on pass: This attack required skill on the pilot’s part. The additional closing speed of 600 mph left only a few seconds for firing, and the risk of collision was high. However, it had a significant psychological impact on the fortress crews, causing them to break formation almost immediately. The Focke-Wulfs then broke away in rolls under the broken formation and regrouped for the next pass.

Rear Pass: Less impressive, this attack gradually became standard because it doubled the duration of firepower, although the B-17 was less vulnerable from the rear. Additionally, the risk of collision was negligible. This attack was carried out at a slightly lower altitude due to the dangerous turbulence created by the propellers of the four-engine aircraft. The pilots engaged emergency power, opened fire, and pulled out on the Gruppenkommandeur’s radio order.

For all these attacks, the assault fighters flew in close formation, as if in a parade. Von Kornatzki claimed that the sight of 30 Focke-Wulfs illuminated by departing shots and forming an unbroken line of fire would quickly unnerve the American crews. Events soon proved him right.

IV/JG 3 was redesignated IV/Sturm/JG 3, more commonly known as “Sturmgruppe Moritz.” It was truly a group of aces. The coveted and sparingly awarded Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross would become commonplace there. In a matter of weeks, pilots such as Klaus Neumann, Hans Weik, and Werner Gerth built astonishing records and became true specialists in hunting four-engine aircraft.

IV/Sturm/JG 3 comprised the 10th, 11th, and 12th Staffeln of JG 3. It was also the only Gruppe in this wing to fly the Fw 190. The other Gruppen, which flew Bf 109s, had to detach around 30 aircraft to “occupy” the enemy escort fighters at altitude. Any combat between Fw 190 A-8/R2s and American fighters was out of the question. The “Sturmbock” was a specialized aircraft that paid the price; it was heavily loaded and armored and stood no chance against the formidable P-51 “Mustang.” Its armor could only delay the inevitable outcome of such combat.

IV/Sturm/JG 3 was declared operational at the end of May, five months after von Kornatzki’s first meeting with Galland. However, the concept of the assault fighter had evolved considerably since December 1943. At the behest of Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, all of the pilots in IV/Sturm/JG 3 were selected from volunteers “for a special and dangerous mission.”

On the day the Sturmgruppe became operational, the pilots took the following oath: “In accordance with the standards of the assault groups, we pledge to fight for the defense of the Reich. We will strive to destroy at least one enemy four-engine aircraft in every mission, ramming it if our onboard weapons prove ineffective.”

Thus began the exploitation of German fanaticism, which led to the formation of the astonishing Sonderkommando Elbe in March 1945. Initially, these were ramming missions with the goal of recovering the pilot. The Fw 190 A-8/R2’s durability was relied upon to allow the pilot to jump out unharmed after the collision. Two methods of ramming were recommended. The first method involved landing on the wing of the B-17 between the engines, inevitably causing the wing to break. The second method simply involved pulverizing the B-17’s rudder with the propeller and the engine’s armored ring!

Göring was enthusiastic and surprised that such a simple solution had not occurred to anyone sooner. The Reichsmarschall could already envision assault fighters in tight formation destroying the last of the American “terrorists.” However, Göring would have to wait until August to witness the first deliberate ramming attacks.

On June 6, 1944, the Allies landed in Normandy. Caught completely off guard, the Luftwaffe only had 319 aircraft (including 80 daytime fighters) on the invasion front compared to the Allies’ more than 6,000 aircraft! In the two days that followed, all fighter squadrons stationed in Germany were hastily transferred to northern France. IV/Sturm/JG 3 was no exception, and one can imagine the enthusiasm of Hauptmann Moritz’s pilots. Without having had the opportunity to engage the four-engine aircraft, they were now going to have to take on Spitfires, Thunderbolts, and Lightnings.

By the evening of June 7, only the four Messerschmitt Bf 109Gs of Stab/JG z.b.V., commanded by Major Walther Dahl, remained to defend the skies of the Reich. Concern finally grew in high places about this state of affairs, and Sturmgruppe Moritz (which had managed not to lose any pilots on the invasion front) was recalled and returned to its “anti-four-engine” role.

More than a month after being declared operational, the assault group settled at the Illesheim airfield. Meanwhile, Fighter Command, aware of the weakness of the forces stationed in Germany, decided to convert two groups of JG 300 (equipped with single-engine night fighters) into daytime fighter groups. Hauptmann Gerhard Stamp’s I/JG 300, flying Bf 109 G-10s, would now provide high-altitude escort for IV/Sturm/JG 3. The Focke-Wulf 190 A-8s of Stab and II/JG 300 would accompany the assault fighters against the B-17s.

With Allied air activity concentrated on the invasion front, the new JG 300 had around two weeks to become cohesive. On July 3, Leutnant Helmut Lebe’s Focke-Wulf 190 crashed on its return from patrol, opening the list of losses for IV/Sturm/JG 3. No other incidents marred the final week of waiting.

The three Sturmstaffeln were scattered around the perimeter of Illesheim, facing the center of this grass airfield. In the event of an alert, they would take off successively at one-minute intervals to avoid collisions in the center of the field, and the 30 assault fighters would be in the air in record time.

FIRST SUCCESS: OSCHERSLEBEN

At 6:10 a.m. on July 7, 1944, German radar stations on the Belgian and Dutch coasts reported large concentrations of bombers over southeastern England. At 7:15 a.m., the Dutch coastal surveillance unit reported that an American bomber formation was flying over the coast. They estimated that there were more than 1,000 four-engine B-17s and B-24s in the formation. This information was immediately transmitted to the 7th Jagddivision in Schleissheim, which issued a 30-minute alert to all its airfields. Based on the Americans’ route, it appeared that the target was the chemical complex in Leuna (Merseburg). This meant that the JG 300 groups were directly involved.

At 8:20 a.m., the green rocket announcing the departure order rose into the sky at the JG 300 airfields. At Illesheim, the Sturmgruppe Moritz, which was already taking off, received orders to join JG 300 over Leipzig. At this point, things took a turn for the worse. The German flak gunners were surprised by the deployment of forces and mistook them for American fighters. They opened fire with their usual accuracy, and II/JG 300 lost four Focke-Wulfs. Two pilots landed in the countryside, and the other two had to parachute out before the gunners realized their mistake. After a few moments of uncertainty, the German formation resumed climbing and reached a holding altitude of 20,000 feet.

On the American side, it quickly became apparent that the Luftwaffe was well organized. On board a Liberator specially equipped to listen to enemy radio communications, an operator heard a German controller provide precise information about the composition of the bomber formations. The controller advised the pilots to attack the third wave, which consisted of B-24s from the 492nd Bombardment Group that had lost their escort when the course was changed.

As the 492nd Bomb Group flew over Oschersleben, 30 Focke-Wulf 190s emerged from a cloud bank and made a deadly rear pass on the Liberators of the last box. The impeccable phalanx of bombers was no more, and the scattered survivors suffered two more attacks before the assault fighters cleared off. Sturmgruppe Moritz had just shot down 23 Liberators in two minutes!

Meanwhile, the first wave of four-engine bombers, attacked by Stab and I/JG 300, had already lost eight aircraft before Lightning fighters from the escort came to the rescue. Despite its efforts, I/JG 300, which was supposed to delay the U.S. fighters, was quickly overwhelmed, and the melee became general. The JG 300 fighters, grappling with a pack of raging Lightnings and Thunderbolts, had difficulty breaking off the fight and lost a dozen aircraft (five pilots were killed). The pilots of VIII Fighter Command claimed 77 confirmed victories, one probable, and 23 damaged fighters in the same engagement, despite losses amounting to nine Thunderbolts and Lightnings.

In Illesheim, where IV/Sturm/JG 3 had just returned, Hauptmann Moritz’s pilots were jubilant. This first sortie was an unprecedented success in the annals of the Luftwaffe. Six assault fighters were missing: Lt. Alois Maier died from injuries sustained in an emergency landing; four other pilots were killed; and only Lt. Hans Iffland was able to evacuate his disabled Fw 190. The destruction of more than 23 Liberators more than compensated for these losses.

As soon as Adolf Galland heard about the assault group’s victory, he arrived in Illesheim that afternoon to congratulate Hauptmann Moritz and his pilots in person. Delighted with their Fw 190 A-8/R2s, the pilots described the battle, emphasizing the devastating effects of the 30mm MK 108 cannons. JG 300 Kommodore Walther Dahl declared that a dozen assault groups would undoubtedly be enough to wipe the four-engine aircraft of the Eighth Air Force from the German skies. An enthusiastic Galland revealed his intention to equip each Geschwader with an assault group as soon as possible. Von Kornatzki’s most optimistic predictions were confirmed on the assault group’s first sortie.

That evening, July 7, the Luftwaffe high command finally believed that it had the miracle weapon that would spare the Nazi war industry from being crushed by bombs.

Official propaganda seized on the story. Throughout the day on July 8, the Reich radio gave a triumphant account: “Under the personal leadership of its Geschwaderkommodore, Major Dahl, the IV Sturmgruppe of the 3rd Fighter Wing, led by Hauptmann Moritz, distinguished itself yesterday by destroying 30 enemy four-engine aircraft in the Oschersleben sector…” On July 13, the Hamburger Tageblatt (the official newspaper of the NSDAP) ran the headline in large print: “Major Dahl and his assault group—the terrorist planes were all destroyed!”

So everyone knew about it. The British radio station in Calais responded quickly, saying, “Dahl and his assault fighters should not delude themselves. We will exterminate them in the very near future, either in the sky or on the ground.” These threatening words prompted the Germans to change their bases on July 14 as follows: Stab/JG 300 and IV/Sturm/JG 3 moved to Memmingen, I/JG 300 moved to Bad Wörishofen, and II/JG 300 moved to Holzkirchen.

SUMMER 1944 OPERATIONS

Despite the detailed combat reports brought back on July 7 by the survivors of the 492nd Bomb Group, the General Staff of the Eighth Air Force refused to take the new “elite squadron” of the Luftwaffe seriously, considering it, at most, a propaganda ploy. The General Staff was disillusioned on July 18 when 300 B-17s and B-24s took off to bomb airfields around Munich.

As the four-engine bombers headed back near Memmingen, 60 Focke-Wulfs from IV/Sturm/JG 3 and II/JG 300 emerged from a cloud barrier and launched a massive frontal attack on the 2nd Division bombers. Simultaneously, the escort fighters were surprised and engaged by 30 Bf 109 G-10s from I/JG 300. Within minutes, the Boeing and Liberator bombers were overrun. Once again, the panic triggered by the initial attack caused the formation to break up, and the assault fighters engaged in a feeding frenzy.

The battle raged for 20 minutes between Memmingen and the Swiss border. Many of the struggling four-engine bombers were trying to reach the border.

The Sturmgruppe Moritz aircraft had to land at Schongau and Holzkirchen because the Memmingen airfield had been devastated by American bombs. The final tally was impressive, to say the least. The number of four-engine aircraft shot down, as reported by the pilots, was reduced to 24, which was still enormous. On the German side, the losses were heavy. Of the three groups engaged, Moritz’s assault group suffered the most: six pilots were killed and five were wounded. This meant that more than one in three assault fighters had been shot down.

The captain of the 10th Sturmstaffel, Oberleutnant Weik, was wounded, and the group lost one of its best pilots, Feldwebel Hubert Borowski. Despite the heavy toll, the morale of the assault group remained high, and in the evening, it was announced that Gruppenkommandeur Wilhelm Moritz had been awarded the Knight’s Cross. The unit would then remain in Schongau, on the border with Austria, to continue operations against the Fifteenth Air Force, which was based in Italy.

The fighting on July 18 had two consequences. The mission report from the American crews was explicit enough to prompt action from the upper echelons of the Eighth Air Force. What had previously been described as a “saturation attack” was renamed, with a hint of respect, a “company front assault.” This term would subsequently appear frequently in American debriefings.

Although the Eighth Air Force staff was aware of the danger posed by these “company fronts,” they believed the fighter escort would quickly defeat the handful of Focke-Wulfs. Notes were sent to the bomber units instructing the crews to maintain formation at all costs until the escorts arrived. However, they forgot that the appearance of a “company front” always coincided with a group of aggressive Messerschmitt 109s engaging the Mustangs and Thunderbolts in dogfights lasting no more than five minutes. At a time when the Messerschmitt was becoming too rare for many American pilots’ liking, one can imagine the ferocity with which U.S. fighters responded to the provocation. This gave the assault group the few minutes it needed to damage the four-engine bombers.

Meanwhile, on the German side, General Galland had just announced his decision to create more assault groups. Four days later, Hauptmann Peters announced that his II/JG 300 pilots were volunteering to be retrained on the Focke-Wulf 190 A-8/R2. The conversion began immediately. The Flugzeugführerschule (B) 16 in Magdeburg detached eight Heinkel He 177 A aircraft to simulate four-engine planes for training combat with gun cameras.

Peters’s pilots threw themselves into these simulations with such enthusiasm that the He 177 crews soon began to fear a collision. This fear was justified when a Sturmbock pushed its pass too far and collided with the rudder of a Heinkel. Fortunately, everyone was found unharmed hanging from their parachutes. However, the He 177 crews decided it was time to let the “savages” of the assault groups finish their training with the “Flying Fortresses” of the Eighth Air Force. The seven Heinkels therefore returned to Magdeburg, and the Germans were forced to declare I/Sturm/JG 300 operational.

On July 20, there was an increase in Allied air activity over the Reich. That day, the B-17s of the 91st Bombardment Group, “The Ragged Irregulars,” set out to attack airfields in the Leipzig area, suspected of serving as hideouts for the new Me 163 rocket fighters, and encountered Sturmgruppe Moritz. The 401st Bomb Squadron, flying low in the formation, bore the brunt of the encounter.

The assault group, ignored by the escort fighters, launched its usual frontal attack and tore the American formation to pieces. Curiously, the Focke-Wulfs did not exploit this advantage as they had on the previous mission. They disappeared from the sky after three minutes. Back at their base in England (Bassingbourn), the 401st Bomb Squadron realized those three minutes cost them nine Flying Fortresses, plus four others so badly damaged they had to be scrapped.

Sturmgruppe Moritz lost two men (Uffz. Heinz Jeworrek and Uffz. Günther Pokorny) and one man was wounded (Lt. Reinhard Kurandt, who died on July 23) during this sortie. The list was beginning to look impressive. Between July 7 and 20, 16 pilots were killed and nine others were wounded in six engagements with the Eighth Air Force. Meanwhile, more than 60 four-engine bombers were shot down—a remarkable figure, considering the assault group rarely had more than 20 Fw 190 A-8/R2s available.

The operational debut of I/Sturm/JG 300 in late July brought relief to Hauptmann Moritz’s pilots, who took the opportunity to rest. During one of I/Sturm/JG 300’s first sorties, the Kapitän of the 6th Sturmstaffel, Oberleutnant Hirschfeld, was shot down and killed. Hirschfeld had 24 victories at the time of his death and was the first ace of the assault group to be lost in combat. He was posthumously awarded the Knight’s Cross.

IV/Sturm/JG 3’s missions resumed on the 29th after a week’s interruption. The next day, as the assault fighters climbed to intercept four-engine aircraft, a mixed formation of Lightning and Thunderbolt aircraft engaged them in a brief dogfight. Two famous pilots from the Gruppe, Lt. Siegfried Schuster and Fw. Willi Maximowitz, were both wounded and forced to make emergency landings.

SETBACKS AND SUCCESSES

August 3 was a bad day for the assault fighters. In the morning, the order to depart arrived at Schongau, where IV/Sturm/JG 3 was stationed. The three staffeln were directed over the Austrian Alps, where they soon made visual contact with a formation of Liberators. The Focke-Wulfs immediately formed a “company front” and made an initial pass through unusually dense defensive fire. One aircraft from the 11th Sturmstaffel was engulfed in flames. The only confirmed victory in this pass was scored by Kapitän Willi Unger of the 12th.

Undeterred, the assault fighters regrouped for a second pass. A second Liberator broke up under the 30mm shells from Unger’s Sturmbock. However, the B-24’s tail gunner had won, as the Focke-Wulf’s BMW 801 engine suddenly stopped, and the Staffelkapitän had to parachute out south of Reutte. The second pass was also the last. The Sturmgruppe had to hastily break off the fight to escape the pack of escorting Lightnings and Thunderbolts.

In Schongau, Hauptmann Moritz assessed the situation: four Liberators had been shot down at the cost of three missing pilots, three killed, one wounded, and one who parachuted out (W. Unger). The toll was all the heavier because the reasons for this failure remained unclear. The already depleted ranks of IV/Sturm/JG 3 could not withstand this pace for long, and the enthusiastic but inexperienced replacements from the fighter schools could never replace the veterans.

Most of the replacement pilots were young non-commissioned officers or cadets who were certainly enthusiastic but had only about 30 hours of flight time, including two on the Fw 190. Ramming, which had been abandoned in favor of the effective MK 108 cannons, would probably suit the abilities of these new recruits better. To prevent the deterioration of his Sturmgruppe, Wilhelm Moritz imposed strict admission requirements. IV/Sturm/JG 3 had to remain an elite group.

The second disaster struck on August 9. True to their usual tactics, the assault fighters followed an isolated formation of B-17s under the cover of clouds. The moment they appeared, the pilots of some 50 P-51 Mustangs, ideally positioned in the sun, spotted the swarm of Focke-Wulfs and dove in. The surprise was total. Although the pilots of Sturmgruppe Moritz partially compensated for the shortcomings of their aircraft with their exceptional skills, they were decimated in four minutes of swirling combat.

Ten Sturmböcke were missing on their return, resulting in the deaths of eight pilots! Uffz. Fritz Eilbrecht, who was wounded, parachuted out. Reinhold Hoffmann, who was also injured, landed in the countryside. An eleventh pilot, Ofhr. Günther Jelinski, returned to Schongau despite serious injuries. These two successive blows, although purely coincidental, seriously affected the pilots’ morale.

The Eighth Air Force, which had not encountered any assault fighters for over two weeks, experienced a brutal awakening on August 15th. That day, 200 Flying Fortresses, each escorted by two fighters, left England with Wiesbaden as their target. As weather conditions deteriorated 20 miles before Trier, the American formation split into several parts. The escort fighters, unable to cover their charges, were forced to split up as well. The American formation stretched 12 miles long, 5 miles wide, and 3 miles high!

The 60 assault fighters of I/Sturm/JG 300 and IV/Sturm/JG 3, operating together for the first time, easily avoided the escorts and reached the “Flying Fortresses.” The 30-minute battle that took place over Trier was a massacre. The incredible results of the engagement were as follows:

Four-engine aircraft claimed:

• Sturmgruppe Moritz (IV/Sturm/JG 3): 41
• Sturmgruppe Bretschneider (II/Sturm/JG 300): 36
• Stab/JG 300 (Major Dahl): 7

Escort fighters claimed:

• Begleitgruppe Stamp (I/JG 300): 18

Fifty percent of these victories were confirmed. Despite losing nine men, German fighters destroyed more than 40 American strategic bombers. Sturmgruppe Moritz took the lion’s share of this success with minimal losses (Uffz. Hermann Christ was missing and Uffz. Wolfgang Engel was wounded).

The same scenario was repeated the next day. The veterans of the 91st Bombardment Group were advancing toward Halle when they had the unpleasant surprise of seeing the famous “company front” 6,500 feet ahead. Leutnant Klaus Bretschneider was replacing Kapitän Peters, who had been wounded in combat a few days earlier.

The contrail seen above dashed the last hopes of the 91st BG crews. The Mustangs and Messerschmitts were already locked in combat. The battle lasted only four minutes, but it was a sad memory for the Americans. For this small raid, the Luftwaffe had deployed only IV/Sturm/JG 3. Two B-17s were shot down in the first pass, four in the second, and during the third, Oberleutnant Ekkehard Tichy (Kapitän of the 13th Sturmstaffel), probably running low on ammunition, decided to ram the B-17.

Tichy’s Focke-Wulf crashed out of control in Abhausen, leaving no survivors. The example had been set! Oblt. Tichy, a famous ace and holder of the Knight’s Cross, was credited with 25 victories at the time of his death. His loss was deeply felt by the members of Sturmgruppe Moritz. Tichy was a legend in his own lifetime. He had requested a transfer to IV/Sturm/JG 3, where he continued to lead the 13th Sturmstaffel despite losing his left eye in combat.

The Battle of August 16 was the last significant engagement of the month. The Luftwaffe made a few sporadic appearances from the 22nd to the 26th, then the Eighth Air Force slowed its activity, and the antagonists entered a period of relative calm until September 11.

A colonel as group commander…

The Germans took advantage of this calm by preparing to form a third assault group. This time, the chosen unit was II/JG 4, and the man who took command of the new Sturmgruppe was none other than von Kornatzki himself! Despite his age and rank of Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel), the “father” of the assault groups was determined to see his ideas through to the end and did not hesitate to return to service to do so.

The volunteers who made up the new Sturmgruppe had little experience; most had flown for less than 20 hours in two-seaters and had only flown solo for 20 minutes in a Focke-Wulf 190. Serious training was required before sending such recruits to face the Eighth Air Force. Von Kornatzki spent more than three weeks giving II/Sturm/JG 4 some relative cohesion. Six pilots were killed while becoming familiar with the Fw 190 A-8/R2. It was an impressive aircraft with no particular vices.

On September 10, Sturmgruppe von Kornatzki, based in Welzow, had the following composition:

• II/Sturm/JG 4. Gruppenkommandeur: Oberstlt. H. Günther von Kornatzki
• Kapitän 5th Sturmstaffel: Hptm. Erich Jugel
• Kapitän 6th Sturmstaffel: Hptm. Manfred Köpke
• Kapitän 7th Sturmstaffel: Oblt. Otmar Zehart
• Kapitän 8th Sturmstaffel: Hptm. Rudolf Schröder
• The Bf 109 G-10s of I and III/JG 4 would provide fighter cover.

The truce was broken by the Eighth Air Force when it launched a large-scale attack on oil and synthetic gasoline factories in central Germany on September 11. In response, the Luftwaffe mobilized and flew more than 400 sorties that day.

IV/Sturm/JG 3 intercepted the B-17s of the 100th Bomb Group, “The Bloody Hundredth,” over Annaberg, shooting down 12 in five minutes. The P-51s escorting the B-17s arrived just in time to stop the massacre. Things did not go so well for I and II/Sturm/JG 300, which were forced to engage in combat with over 100 Mustangs and Thunderbolts near Eisenach. Thus, they missed their rendezvous with the four-engine bombers. The assault fighters managed to break away with minimal damage (three pilots were killed). A few Sturmböcke then latched onto a stray B-17. Unteroffizier Walfeld rammed a B-17; another pilot immediately followed suit. Both jumped out unharmed with their parachutes. The next day, the two raiders painted miniature skulls on the tails of their new planes.

During its first mission, II/Sturm/JG 4 engaged the 96th and 452nd Bomb Groups near Chemnitz. The assault fighters shot down 12 bombers. First Lieutenant Alfred Lausch was killed when he rammed the thirteenth. Eleven other pilots died with him when they were shot down by crossfire from the 96th BG boxes. In addition to these eleven fatalities, Lt. Wolfgang Hankner and Fw. Joseph Tüssner were wounded and landed in the field. Two pilots parachuted in: Fw. Otto Kiefer and Fw. F. Karl Frank.

This marked the beginning of a streak of bad luck that plagued II/Sturm/JG 4 until its dissolution. The next day, the Eighth Air Force returned to the same targets, only to encounter the three assault groups again—or rather, what was left of them. II/Sturm/JG 300 and IV/Sturm/JG 3, closely pursued by escort fighters, managed to engage three formations of B-17s 15 miles from Magdeburg. The pilots of II/Sturm/JG 300 were the only ones able to carry out their attacks in good conditions and were undoubtedly responsible for shooting down 23 four-engine bombers during the battle.

The Focke-Wulf 190 A-8/R2s of Sturmgruppe Moritz engaged the U.S. fighters and performed miracles; the seven Mustangs they shot down exploded on impact from their 30mm guns. However, five Fw 190s were missing upon their return to Schafstädt (three were killed, one was wounded, and one parachuted out). Consequently, Sturmgruppe Moritz was temporarily out of action because the number of available aircraft was insufficient to form a Staffel.

In Welzow, there was consternation. Von Kornatzki’s II/Sturm/JG 4 was attempting to reach bombers when it was intercepted above Halberstadt by 80 P-51 Mustangs. The encounter ended tragically for Oberstleutnant von Kornatzki and eleven of his pilots, who were shot down and killed. Of the 13 Focke-Wulfs shot down, only Oberfähnrich Franz Schaar parachuted to safety. After its second sortie, II/Sturm/JG 4 was virtually at the end of its tether and had lost its Gruppenkommandeur. Hauptmann Rudolf Schröder, Kapitän of the 8th Sturmstaffel, succeeded von Kornatzki as leader of the Sturmgruppe.

September 13 was no calmer than the previous two days. For the third time, the Eighth Air Force attacked the chemical and steel industries in the Merseburg area. Seriously weakened by the fighting of the previous days, the Luftwaffe deployed 130 JG 300 fighters. The controller of the 1st Fighter Division provided incorrect vectors and directed II/Sturm/JG 300 to engage the American escort fighters. Meanwhile, Hauptmann Stamp’s Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-10s were forced into a spinning battle, and the assault fighters, led by Kommodore Walther Dahl, hastily withdrew.

Then, the Stab and II/Sturm/JG 300 headed north to intercept the four-engine bombers. It was a futile effort. Most of the Focke-Wulfs exhausted their ammunition in a fierce battle with a group of Lightnings. The dozen or so assault fighters that finally broke through to the B-17s carried out a few disorderly attacks with little success. Kommodore Dahl, who was about to open fire, realized that the trigger on his weapons was no longer working. He continued his attack, rammed a Flying Fortress, and jumped out with his parachute.

On September 13, the Eighth Air Force lost only four B-17s and shot down 36 JG 300 pilots. After three consecutive days of combat, the Bombardment Groups, which had been severely tested (with around 70 four-engine aircraft shot down, missing, or retired), significantly slowed the pace of missions over the Reich. The Luftwaffe welcomed the respite with relief, as some of its squadrons—especially JG 300—had been reduced to a shadow of their former selves after suffering losses of over 60% of their strength.

Once again, it was necessary to replenish the three decimated assault groups, particularly II/Sturm/JG 4 and II/Sturm/JG 300. The situation of the Sturmgruppen on September 24 was as follows:

• Stab/JG 300 (Major Dahl), Finsterwalde
• II/Sturm/JG 300 (Hptm. Peters), also in Finsterwalde
• IV/Sturm JG 3 (Hptm. Moritz), Alteno
• II/Sturm/JG 4 (Major Schröder), Welzow

On September 27, the Luftwaffe gave a spectacular demonstration of its ability to recover. The 2nd Division sent 315 Liberators to bomb the Henschel factories in Kassel. As the Americans approached their targets, the 445th Bombardment Group lost contact with the rest of the formation due to a navigation error. The incident went unnoticed, most likely due to the poor weather conditions that day. The 37 Liberators strayed as far as Göttingen without an escort. Göttingen, mistakenly identified as Kassel, was heavily bombed.

The Luftwaffe arrived 10 minutes after the bombing while the 445th Bombardment Group was flying over Eisenach. Assault fighters from II/Sturm/JG 4 and IV/Sturm/JG 3 arrived at 6:00 a.m. and made a pass. Shortly thereafter, the Bf 109 G-10s from I/JG 4 and I/JG 1 arrived. The “Sturmböcke,” grouped in pairs, then began methodically shooting down the scattered Liberators.

The unexpected arrival of the P-51s of the 361st Fighter Group ended the massacre. In a sky filled with debris, disabled aircraft, and parachutes, the Mustangs and the Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt aircraft spun briefly before everything calmed down. Twenty-five Liberators had disappeared! In addition to these losses, two other B-24s landed in France, two more landed at Manston, and one crashed during its final approach at Tibenham. The 445th Bomb Group now held a record for the most losses: 236 crew members were missing, one was dead, and 13 were wounded in a single mission.

This disaster highlighted the skill of German fighter controllers in exploiting the slightest American error. The proliferation of assault fighters was all the more worrying since the losses inflicted on them did not seem to diminish their offensive potential. If such disasters were to be repeated, it was certain that the strategic bombing of Germany would soon be called into serious question, an inconceivable hypothesis in September 1944 when nothing was going right for the Third Reich.

However, the assault fighters paid dearly for their success. Sturmgruppe Schröder lost seven pilots, including Oberleutnant Otmar Zehart (Kapitän, 7th Sturmstaffel). Oberfähnrich Franz Schaar, who had barely recovered from his parachute jump on the 12th, was wounded again and landed in the countryside. Additionally, Obergefreiter Heinz Papenberog successfully rammed one of the B-24s. Sturmgruppe Moritz was luckier; all four of its downed pilots parachuted to safety. The hero of the day was undoubtedly Oberleutnant Oskar Romm, who shot down three Liberators in three minutes of combat.

The next day, disaster struck again when 49 four-engine bombers failed to return from a second sortie over Kassel. Once more, the executioners were the Sturmböcke of II/Sturm/JG 4 and IV/Sturm/JG 3. In two days of combat, the assault fighters had shot down 70 of the Eighth Air Force’s strategic bombers.

SETBACKS: OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1944

During October, the skies over the Reich were strangely devoid of German fighters. The Eighth Air Force fighter groups reported destroying only 72 Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts, a paltry figure compared to the 469 claimed in September. The American tendency to overlook the assault fighters was exacerbated by the operational status of the Messerschmitt 262s of Kommando Nowotny, based at Hesepe and Achmer, which was reached on October 3. The impressive combat reports brought back by U.S. pilots during the initial encounters foreshadowed an eventful autumn.

For the American general staff, it was clear that this calm concealed a vast reorganization. This was partly true. IV/Sturm/JG 3 had just amalgamated with the other three Gruppen of JG 3, which were now stationed in Germany. On October 4, the III. Gruppe of JG 300 was attached to the wing, and from then on, the II./Sturm/JG 300 would be covered by the 70 Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-10 and G-14 aircraft of the I. and III./JG 300. On October 15, IV./JG 300 was formed with members of the former Zerstörergeschwader 76, commanded by Hauptmann Offterdinger.

The Eighth Air Force encountered the Sturmgruppen twice in October. On October 6, IV/Sturm/JG 3 shot down eleven B-17Gs, primarily from the 549th Bombardment Squadron. II/Sturm/JG 4’s bad luck continued when they were surprised by 40 Mustangs while attempting to intercept the 385 B.G. Nine Focke-Wulfs did not return to Welzow (seven were killed and two were wounded).

The next day, the Flying Fortresses of the 94th Bombardment Group (BG) took on the II/Sturm/JG 4 and II/Sturm/JG 300. On that day, Lieutenant Klaus Bretschneider was leading the JG 300 assault fighters. He shot down two B-17s and, running out of ammunition, rammed the third. Although 14 B-17s were lost, the American crews found the German attacks to be hesitant and disorderly. There were no further sorties by the assault groups in October. It was the calm before the storm of November 2.

On November 2, the biggest air battle of the fall took place when the Eighth Air Force launched 1,000 Fortresses and Liberators to once again crush the refineries at Merseburg-Leuna. The American bombers were divided into two waves of 683 and 325 aircraft, respectively, and were escorted by 600 P-51 Mustangs. They encountered no opposition during the first 60 miles over German territory. Nearly 500 fighters took off from Jagdgeschwader 2, 3, 4, and 27 bases.

Shortly before noon, the first bursts of gunfire rang out at the Borkheide airfield, where a patrol of 30 Mustangs carried out a devastating strafing run (one JG 300 aircraft was out of action, and 25 Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-14 AS aircraft were burned or destroyed). Of the 500 Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt aircraft that took off, only 300 reached the bombers amid terrible weather conditions.

The 39 Focke-Wulf aircraft of Sturmgruppe Moritz, taking off from Schafstädt, intercepted the 91 B.G. “The Ragged Irregulars” above Bitterfeld, destroying 14 B-17Gs in two passes. The Kapitän of the 14th Sturmstaffel, Oberleutnant Werner Gerth, rammed a “Fortress.” Witnesses saw him bail out of his Focke-Wulf, but his parachute failed to open. The Sturmböcke were about to launch a third attack when an avalanche of P-51s from the 55th Fighter Group arrived. The assault fighters lost a dozen of their own while trying to break off the fight.

At Schafstädt, Hauptmann Moritz assessed the situation: eleven killed or missing and four wounded who had parachuted out (Uffz. Siegfried Küttner, Fifw. Walther Kutz, Lt. Peter Sarfert, and Ofw. Klaus Neumann). The Sturmgruppe had been decimated once again. Most of its planes were riddled with holes, and the surviving pilots were completely exhausted. It was the end for IV/Sturm/JG 3!

Meanwhile, II/Sturm/JG 4 had made contact with the 457 B.G. bombers over Köthen. The first Flying Fortress was shot down by Oblt. Markhoff (Kapitän der 8. Sturmstaffel) and the second by Uffz. Scherer. Ten more were shot down during the six-minute battle. American defensive fire took a heavy toll on the assault fighters. Hauptmann Erich Jugel (Kapitän der 5. Sturmstaffel) was one of the first to fall. The Mustangs, which had outflanked the Messerschmitts providing cover, then arrived to carry out a veritable execution. Of the 22 aircraft that had left Welzow, only six returned. The others were shot down or forced to land. Six were killed and three were wounded after parachuting out (Uffz. Herbert Helzel, Lt. Hans Hoster, and Uffz. Albert Erler).

On November 2, the Eighth Air Force lost 76 four-engine aircraft. Thirty-two of these were attributed to the 14th Flak Division in Merseburg, 26 to the assault groups, and 18 to the other fighter groups involved. It was a “victory” for the Luftwaffe, but at the cost of 70 killed and 28 wounded pilots!

Following the November 2 battle, II/Sturm/JG 4 and IV/Sturm/JG 3 lost their assault group designations. Hauptmann Moritz and several IV/Sturm/JG 3 veterans were sent on leave. Command of the Gruppe was handed over to Hauptmann Hubert-York Weydenhammer, who was killed on December 25, 1944. The Focke-Wulf 190 A-8/R2s were kept until they were “worn out” in combat—a cost-saving measure that would prove very costly in the long run.

During its ill-fated operational career, II/Sturm/JG 4 lost 52 pilots, 19 of whom were wounded, and shot down approximately 40 four-engine aircraft. This is hardly surprising when you consider that 90% of its personnel were inexperienced young pilots whose fanatical courage was their only defense against the Mustangs. IV/Sturm/JG 3, an elite group, achieved spectacular successes; its score exceeded 400 four-engine bombers. However, the losses were also heavy. Between July 7 and November 2, 1944, 72 pilots were killed and 34 were wounded.

The Last Operations of II/Sturm/JG 300: November 1944 – March 1945

From November onward, events over the Reich took a dramatic turn for German fighter aircraft. Despite Speer’s aircraft industry’s formidable production rate (2,876 Bf 109s and Fw 190s in September) and the entry into service of formidable new models from Tank and Messerschmitt (Fw 190 D-9, Me 262, Bf 109 K, etc.), each major incursion by the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces cost the Luftwaffe around 80 fighter pilots and 100 aircraft. The force ratio was 1:20 in favor of the Americans, and the average survival time of a young pilot assigned to defend the Reich could now be estimated in terms of flight hours (10 hours…).

As the only operational assault group, Major Peters’s II/Sturm/JG 300 participated in nearly all the air battles at the end of the war. We will mention only the main ones.

November 27: The I Jagdkorps sent 750 fighters to intercept 800 four-engine bombers from the Eighth Air Force, but not a single bomber was shot down. The 357th and 353rd Fighter Groups’ Mustangs thwarted all German attacks and destroyed 51 Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts at the cost of 11 of their own. Sturmgruppe Peters lost eleven assault fighters in the Halberstadt-Quedlinburg-Aschersleben triangle (seven killed and four wounded).

December 17: Three groups from JG 300 took off late in the morning to attack a formation of 400 four-engine bombers from the Fifteenth Air Force crossing Silesia (the target was the Auschwitz chemical complex in Poland). The fighting between Olmütz and Prerau was disastrous for JG 300. The assault group attempted to break through the escort fighters and paid dearly for it, with seven killed, three wounded, and two Liberators destroyed. III and IV/JG 300 lost two and eleven Messerschmitts, respectively, while trying to oppose 200 U.S. fighters.

December 24: For the first time since von Runstedt’s offensive began, the Eighth Air Force was called upon to play a decisive role in the Battle of the Bulge. Two thousand thirty-four strategic bombers from the Eighth Air Force, 500 Halifaxes and Lancasters from the Royal Air Force, and 376 medium bombers from the Ninth Air Force took advantage of the good weather to attack German airfields, communication routes, and positions. The airfields in the Frankfurt-Darmstadt sector alone were visited by 1,400 heavily escorted “heavy” bombers.

On the way there, the American bombers fought Jagdgeschwader 2, 4, and 11, and on the way back, they fought JG 300. JG 300’s II/Sturm never reached the four-engine bombers after engaging with Thunderbolts and Mustangs from the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces south of Kassel. Leutnant Bretschneider’s “Red 1,” who was leading the assault fighters, crashed near Oberaula after being shot down by P-51s. Five other Sturmgruppe pilots suffered the same fate. Thirteen Sturmböcke were missing on their return to Lebnitz.

The Messerschmitt escort also suffered losses. Near Fritzlar, III and IV/JG 300 were attacked by Mustangs, who shot down seven of their planes and lost five Bf 109s. Leutnant Günther Rudolph (12. Staffel) managed to abandon his Bf 109 G-10 above Uttershausen, but his parachute failed to open. On December 24, the Luftwaffe paid a heavy price: It deployed Jagdgeschwader 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 26, 27, 53, 54, 77, and 300 (plus a few Fw 190 F-8s from SG 4) and lost 85 pilots who were killed, missing, or captured, with 26 others who were wounded. One hundred and six pilots were out of action in one day!

December 31: Following the December 30 attacks on railway junctions and communication routes in Kassel, Mannheim, and Kaiserslautern, the Eighth Air Force proceeded to the next phase of its offensive, targeting the synthetic fuel plants in Hamburg and Misburg. The bomber formations headed for northern Germany that day numbered around 1,300 B-17s and B-24s. JG 300 and 301 took off with a total of 14 Staffeln (two on Bf 109s and the rest on Fw 190 A-8s, A-9s, and D-9s), for a total of 160 fighters.

The Bf 109 G-10s of III/JG 300 surprised a fighter group near Langenhagen and shot down four Mustangs. In the violent melee that followed, Major Hans-Karl Kamp, commander of III./JG 300, and a pilot from the 10th Staffel were killed. Meanwhile, II/Sturm/JG 300 formed a “company front” and engaged an old adversary, the 100th Bombardment Group, over Rotenburg. Despite harassment from the omnipresent Mustangs, the assault fighters carried out attack after attack. Fourteen B-17s were shot down, half of which belonged to the “Bloody Hundredth.” Six Focke-Wulfs did not return to Labnitz.

January 14: For the first time since the beginning of 1945, the Eighth Air Force launched a large-scale raid. The target was—once again—the fuel factories in central Germany, and the weather was splendid. A violent reaction from the Luftwaffe was expected, so the 600-strong fleet of four-engine bombers was literally surrounded by Mustangs. A second wave of bombers took off to attack the bridges over the Rhine in the Cologne area.

Hundreds of Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs took off from nearly all the German fighter airfields. Northwest of Berlin, the P-51s of the 357th Fighter Group spotted the Sturmjäger of II./Sturm/JG 300 preparing to attack the 100th Bombardment Group (BG). Lt. Col. Dregne, leader of the 357th FG, divided his Mustangs into two groups: one to follow the Focke-Wulfs in their attack and the other to face the approximately 100 Messerschmitt Bf 109s of I, III, and IV/JG 300.

The ensuing battle pitted 130 German fighters against 60 Mustangs. Despite their numerical superiority, JG 300 fighters suffered heavy losses (32 Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs). However, Oberfeldwebel Rudi Zwesken gathered the surviving assault fighters and attacked a formation of eight B-17s from the 390th Bomb Group. The B-17s’ ordeal lasted more than 15 minutes, during which the Sturmböcke made multiple passes and finally defeated the eight four-engine bombers (plus two others from the main formation). German fighter losses for the day amounted to 107 pilots killed or missing and 32 wounded—a record!

March 2, 1945: Sent on patrol between the Elbe and Schwarze Elster rivers, the remnants of II/Sturm/JG 300, led by Oberleutnant Radener, were “topped” by 50 Mustangs, and four Focke-Wulfs were shot down. All four pilots were killed, including Fähnrich Richard Löfgen (5. Sturmstaffel), who crashed his “Green 2” aircraft north of Torgau. Meanwhile, the Messerschmitts of III./JG 300, engaged with other P-51s near Belzig, lost two Bf 109 G-10s. The commander of III. Gruppe, Hauptmann Peter Jenne, an ace with 17 victories, crashed in Schmerwitz. His pilots avenged him by shooting down three Mustangs and two Thunderbolts in the same sector.

March 24: 1,400 strategic bombers raided northern Germany! The 1st Jagddivision scrambled its depleted forces (JG 301 had been almost wiped out on March 12). The first U.S. wave, consisting of 900 B-17s, was heading for airfields east of the Rhine. The Mustangs of the 3rd Division preceded them. The Focke-Wulf 190 A-8/R2 and A-9 aircraft of Sturmgruppe Radener were directed east of Göttingen to intercept the four-engine bombers.

However, disaster struck in the form of the Mustangs of the 353rd Fighter Group, which swept the assault fighters from the sky. The 5th Sturmstaffel lost five pilots (Uffz. Hans Bastek, Uffz. Fritz Dürrling, Fw. Günther Kublank, Gefr. K. Heinz Hachmann, Ofw. Claus Richter), and the 6th Sturmstaffel was almost completely wiped out (Uffz. Gausepohl, Uffz. Hackenschmitt, Fw. Kloos, Fw. Preiss, Uffz. Weisbrod, and Lt. Pflüger were killed. The 7th had “only” two fatalities (Fw. Noske and Hptm. Loos). The final tragedy occurred during the return to Löbnitz when Unteroffizier Hugo Altenhof’s “Yellow 12” spun out of control during its final approach and crashed. Fourteen were killed, one was wounded, and 20 aircraft were destroyed.

Everything seemed to indicate that this disaster would put an end to the assault groups’ careers. However, it was not over yet. Despite the fuel crisis and the untenability of its airfields, not to mention its mounting losses, the Luftwaffe was preparing a big surprise for the Eighth Air Force at the end of March.

Sonderkommando Elbe

Project Elbe was born during the last days of February 1945, probably the most insane project ever conceived by the Luftwaffe leadership. Oberst Hajo Herrmann, famous for the successes of his “Wilde Sau” in the summer of 1943, was the instigator of the project. Operations by the assault groups revealed an undeniable suicidal tendency among German fighter pilots, though ramming attacks had been carried out on a very small scale. Herrmann wanted to take advantage of this nihilistic mindset and proposed to Göring that volunteers be recruited to form a squadron of suicide fighters similar to the recent (at that time) Japanese kamikaze.

However, “suicide” was not the exact word, since each pilot was to be equipped with a parachute for a hypothetical evacuation after a crash. A “Flying Fortress” for a Messerschmitt! Göring enthusiastically approved the project, as he had nothing left to lose. Nevertheless, Fighter General Gollob and Oberst Dahl, the fighter inspector, described the project as insane and refused to support it. Unlike the assault groups, which brought together the Reich’s elite defense pilots, the Sonderkommando Elbe would be nothing more than a group of young fanatics who would be needlessly sacrificed.

Anyway, there was no time for discussion. In early March, Oberst Hermann began recruiting “volunteers for a very dangerous mission, ready to give their lives for the salvation of the Third Reich” from schools and fighter squadrons. In Mühldorf, for example, where the young pilots of the Ergänzungs-Jagdgeschwader (EJG) 1 were based, a high-ranking officer arrived to oversee recruitment.

After explaining Germany’s dire military situation and the absolute necessity of a decisive operation, the officer asked for volunteers. Five did so: Ofhr. Stumpf, Ofhr. Pollmeyer, Ofhr. Pöschel, Ofhr. Günther and Uffz. Hopp. Their average age was 20. This scene played out at many Luftwaffe airfields.

Throughout March, more than 200 pilots arrived in Stendal, the assembly point of the Sonderkommando, to undergo a 10-day training course. Professor Härtel from the Propaganda Ministry gave a series of political instruction classes, which constituted most of the course. An Oberfeldwebel, a veteran of the assault groups who had successfully rammed a B-17 before, introduced the volunteers to the various methods of “ramming.” Outside of class hours, members of the Sonderkommando had complete freedom of action. The most enjoyable part of the training was undoubtedly the daily distribution of one bottle of cognac and 40 cigarettes per pilot.

The Sonderkommando Elbe was declared operational at the end of March. It was structured like a Geschwader with four Gruppen and placed under the command of Major Otto Kahnke, a famous one-legged veteran of the bombing campaign. The first Gruppe and the Stab remained in Stendal; the second Gruppe was stationed in Delitzsch, near Bitterfeld; the third Gruppe was in Mörtitz, north of Leipzig; and the fourth Gruppe—30 men, including Oberfähnrich Stumpf and his comrades from EJG 1—moved to Gardelegen.

The Sonderkommando had 190 Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt aircraft at its disposal, collected at random from airfields or fighter schools. The group in Gardelegen borrowed its Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-10s from the nearby Alperstedt airfield and JG 3. The attack by the Sonderkommando Elbe was scheduled for the first week of April and was given the code name Unternehmen Werwolf (Operation Werewolf).

At 9:00 a.m. on April 7, 1945, sector control reported a raid of 1,300 American bombers and 850 fighters heading for Dessau. At 9:30 a.m., the Sonderkommando pilots were alerted and received their final instructions. Suddenly, it was discovered that half of the planes had empty fuel tanks. Mechanics and pilots quickly siphoned fuel from the Ju 88s and Ju 52s and carried it in buckets to the fighters. In Gardelegen, there was a fuel shortage, so several Messerschmitts were left unfueled (a detail that probably saved the lives of the EJG 1 pilots).

At 10:50 a.m., the alert sounded. The pilots of the refueled planes took their seats. Through their headphones, they heard the martial strains of the “Badenweiler Marsch,” interrupted every five minutes by a controller announcing the location of the American raid. At 11:16 a.m., the green departure flare rose above the four airfields of Sonderkommando Elbe, and 183 Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt aircraft took off in successive waves.

Then came the uneventful climb to 36,000 feet for most of the aircraft, which were relieved of all their weapons. The Sonderkommando was soon joined by around 40 Messerschmitt 262s belonging to JG 7 and I KG (J) 54. Their mission was to neutralize the American fighter cover. All communication between the aircraft was impossible because the transmitters had been removed from the radios. Only the controller’s voice and military music connected the pilots to the outside world.

Above Lake Steinhuder, west of Hanover, the 50 aircraft of the first wave made visual contact with the “Flying Fortresses.” The American crews were probably very surprised to hear, “Hundred plus bandits at twelve o’clock above!” on their radios. It was true; the characteristic trumpeting of the Daimler-Benz engines was soon drowned out by the roar of the four-engine bombers’ automatic weapons.

Like so many rockets, the first sections of the suicide fighters flew through the formations of the 452nd and 490th Bomb Groups. There was a blinding flash, then another. Where two 452nd Bomb Group Fortresses had been, incandescent debris rained down. A third collision caused panic in the ranks of the 388th Bombardment Group as the Fortresses veered off in all directions, trying to avoid blowing up parachutes. A Liberator that was unable to avoid a Bf 109 became the fourth victim. A B-17 from the 490th BG was cut in two by a Focke-Wulf, and another aircraft from the same group was hit by an armed Messerschmitt.

The first attack was over. Most of the suicide fighters had been diverted or shot down by the defensive fire of the bombers. Around the formations, a gigantic air battle took place between over 300 Mustangs and 150 German fighters. The massacre lasted three-quarters of an hour, during which almost all of the Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts were shot down. A final Bf 109, ignored by the Mustangs, collided with a Flying Fortress from the 100th Bomb Group. Then, the German planes disappeared from the sky.

In Stendal, Delitzsch, Mörtitz, and Gardelegen, 15 surviving fighters were seen returning. Operation Werwolf ended in disaster. A total of 77 Sonderkommando pilots were reported missing, i.e., dead, while the others managed to make emergency landings or parachute jumps. Of the 18 American four-engine aircraft lost, eight were rammed, and the other ten were shot down by Flak and Me 262s. The three missing P-51s had been lost accidentally on their return to England.

On April 8, the remnants of Sonderkommando Elbe moved on to Pocking. There, they met Oberst Hajo Herrmann, who insisted on congratulating the survivors in person. A decoration ceremony was held at the airfield, during which the decorated pilots were promoted to the next rank. Suddenly, the ceremony was cut short when 60 P-51s appeared, flying low over the airfield. Within minutes, all of the Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt aircraft belonging to the Sonderkommando were engulfed in flames.

When the Mustangs finally flew away, only the Bücker 181, 131, Siebel 204, and Arado 96 aircraft, which had been camouflaged around the perimeter of Pocking, remained intact. The Eighth Air Force would never again have to deal with the now-reduced Sonderkommando Elbe, which was immobilized in Czechoslovakia with only a few training and liaison aircraft.

However, Oberst Hermann refused to admit defeat. He had just come up with a new plan. Since it was no longer possible to destroy the US four-engine aircraft in the air, the Sonderkommando would attack them on their own bases. Operation “Bienenkorb” (Beehive) was born! The plan was to land at night on large Allied airfields in Italy (Foggia, Rimini, etc.) and mine hangars and aircraft. This principle could potentially be extended to other targets. The quiet, light Bücker 181 “Bestmann” aircraft would be perfect for the mission.

At the end of April, a major and three men took advantage of a clear night to land two Bücker 181s behind enemy lines and blow up the famous Danube bridge near Regensburg. This initial success of “Bienenkorb” encouraged Herrmann to continue with his idea. The next day, Oberfähnrich Otto Stumf and his comrades took off for Klagenfurt, Austria, where the second “Bienenkorb” operation was scheduled to launch on the night of April 29th and 30th, coinciding with the full moon.

The journey cost the Sonderkommando six aircraft, which disappeared during the low-altitude crossing of the Alpine passes, as well as four more that crashed upon landing. The ten surviving aircraft landed in Klagenfurt, which was already occupied by remnants of the Hungarian Air Force fleeing the Soviet advance. The airfield itself was a jumble of all kinds of wreckage and served as a refuge for many Hungarian families in exile.

The members of the Sonderkommando found a small stock of fuel there, as well as several Fieseler “Storch” aircraft, which they immediately requisitioned. Bad weather on the Italian front during the last three days of April prevented any sorties. On May 1, 1945, an order arrived in Klagenfurt from headquarters, specifying that the Sonderkommando Elbe should carry out sabotage operations behind Soviet lines in Hungary. Oberfähnrich Stumpf and his comrades from EJG 1 were given explosives and Panzerfausts.

From May 2 to 7, they landed behind enemy lines in the Stuhlweissenburg area with the Storch and Bücker aircraft and blew up several railways and bridges. On the night of May 7-8, Oberfähnrichen Schwarz and Stumpf were preparing to destroy a railway junction north of Budapest when they learned that Germany had surrendered unconditionally. The adventure was over for the survivors of Sonderkommando Elbe.

The futile sacrifice of the Elbe pilots symbolizes the monstrous obstinacy of the Nazi leaders who, until the very last day, tried to wrest air superiority from the Allies. This incredible surge, which sent 183 suicide fighters against the Eighth Air Force, was, above all, a prestige operation—completely gratuitous in the spring of 1945. More serious, however, was the existence of the three assault groups, which cost the Americans more than 800 strategic bombers. The assault fighters’ appearance in July 1944 came too late to influence the outcome of the air battle over Germany decisively, but they contributed greatly to turning the skies over the Reich into hell, where thousands of airmen on both sides disappeared.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: The Focke-Wulf 190 A-8/R2

The Focke-Wulf 190 A-8/R2 was one of the final versions of the Fw 190 A to enter production. This low-wing cantilever monoplane’s wing was constructed in one piece, with the two wings joined by the main spar. Its general structure consisted of two box spars and steel ribs, and its skin was made of duralumin. Numerous removable panels provided access to the weapons, flap, and aileron mechanisms.

The flight controls were direct and manual for normal flight, particularly for the ailerons, while the flap controls were electrically operated. A miniature electric motor powered the flaps by acting on their central hinge. Another motor of the same type, located at the base of the tailplane, adjusted the stabilizer’s incidence from +4° to -1°.

Despite the large radial engine that determined the shape of the front fuselage section, the aircraft’s overall silhouette remained elegant. The fuselage was of the classic monocoque type constructed of lightweight duralumin. It had a circular front section that gradually tapered and ovalized toward the tailplane. It consisted of steel struts and stringers and was divided into two parts. The first part housed the engine, its mountings, and the cowling armament, while the second part housed the cockpit, fuel tanks, compass, radio equipment, and control cables.

The landing gear retracted inward into the wings and was electrically operated, with a manual control provided in case of failure. The wheels had a track width of 11.5 feet and were equipped with differential hydraulic brakes. The tail wheel, which was part of the main landing gear, retracted partially.

The horizontal tail surfaces were average in size, and the fabric-covered, metal-framed elevator had two metal tabs for ground adjustment by twisting. The rear tip of the fuselage extended to form the vertical stabilizer. It consisted of two half-shells that housed the tailwheel retraction mechanism, the electric stabilizer actuator, and the elevator and rudder control rods. A duralumin leading edge locked the two halves together. The fuselage ended with the Flettner-compensated rudder. Like all the aircraft’s control surfaces, it was made of fabric-covered metal.

Engine and Performance

The BMW 801 D-2 engine was a 14-cylinder, double-row, air-cooled, radial engine equipped with a two-stage compressor that developed 1,705 hp at takeoff. Fuel was injected directly into the cylinders. During flight, an automatic device regulated the engine speed, intake pressure, and fuel mixture. The engine was equipped with an overpower device that the pilot could use for about ten minutes while monitoring the temperature gauge. This increased the top speed by about 12 mph.

The standard Fw 190 A-8 often had its rear fuselage tank replaced with an unprotected 37-gallon MW 50 tank (consisting of 49.5% water, 50% methanol, and 0.5% anti-corrosion liquid), which provided more sustained bursts of extra power. A 22.5-gallon GM 1 tank could also be installed in the same location, providing spectacular results and giving the aircraft an additional 37 mph in climb and level flight at 2700 rpm. However, this last modification was rarely carried out on the Fw 190 A-8/R2.

Starting in August 1944, the new BMW 801 TU engine was available. Installing it resulted in a 77-pound weight increase and a slight improvement in overall performance. The three-bladed, variable-pitch, constant-speed propeller measured 10.8 feet in diameter. Pitch adjustment during flight was automatic and depended on engine speed.

Fuel System

The three fuel tanks, all of which were self-sealing, were housed in the fuselage. The two main tanks, with capacities of 61 and 77 gallons, were secured under the cockpit floor by an ingenious system of canvas straps. This system was simple and allowed mechanics to replace a damaged tank in a matter of minutes. A third cylindrical tank with a 30-gallon capacity was fitted into a vertical cradle behind the pilot’s seat. Finally, almost all Fw 190 A-8/R2s were delivered with an ETC 501 ventral mount and a 79-gallon drop tank.

Cockpit and Equipment

The technicians at Focke-Wulf prioritized the highly functional layout of the cockpit; however, there were more than 80 dials, push buttons, and levers spread across two instrument panels and three consoles. The pilot had the excellent Revi 16 B collimator mounted slightly to the left of the longitudinal axis. Consisting of a lens chamber, a 21-watt lamp, and a rheostat, the Revi 16 B allowed for precise targeting at ranges of 2,950 feet or more (optimum accuracy at 490-650 feet) without altering the target’s silhouette. An optional dark green filter (Dunkelgrün 71) allowed it to be used at night.

The high position of the rudder made maneuvering in combat easier, and pilots found acceleration less difficult than in the Bf 109. The Fw 190 A-8/R2’s structure could withstand a maximum of 6 G at full load.

Armor Protection

The aircraft earned the nickname “Sturmbock” (storm buck) thanks to its impressive array of armor. The assault fighter’s airframe was 432 pounds heavier due to nine metal plates that protected the cockpit, fuel tank, and oil cooler. These plates formed the front ring of the engine cowling. A 15mm armor plate was fitted to the shape of the main instrument panel, and two triangular plates were fitted under the sides of the windshield. Finally, a horizontal panel was attached under the cowling weapon mount to mainly protect the pilot’s legs in the event of an explosion in the MG 131 ammunition magazines.

With a thickness of 50mm at the front and 30mm at the sides, the bulletproof plexiglass windshield could withstand all calibers. This subsequently saved the pilots of the assault groups from many mishaps, as they often returned with opaque or cracked windshields.

A system of generously sized armor plates protected the pilot from behind (standard equipment on the Fw 190 A-8, as well as the armored engine ring). The sliding canopy and armored headrest could be jettisoned in flight with two explosive charges, enabling evacuation with minimal difficulty.

Radio and Navigation

The FuG 16 ZY radio transceiver transmitted instructions from sector control (Jaddivision) and conversations between aircraft simultaneously. The fighter formations’ route was tracked by radar and directed by a controller until visual contact was established. Once combat ended, control (Y-Verfahren) took over the squadrons and isolated aircraft individually and guided “emergency cases” to the nearest airfield. Starting in spring 1944, the evolution of aerial combat forced Jagddivisionen to radio the locations of emergency landing sites, the courses to be followed, and the respective positions of German and American formations. U.S. airmen quickly learned to listen to enemy radio communications.

The Fw 190 A-8/R2 was equipped with a FuG 25a, which was housed in the rear of the fuselage for friend-or-foe identification. Pilots highly appreciated this equipment.

Armament

• The Rüstsatz R2 armament consisted of:
• Two synchronized 13mm MG 131 machine guns in the cowling
• Two synchronized 20mm MG 151/20E cannons in the wing roots
• Two MK 108 30mm wing cannons that fire outside the propeller field
• Finally, a BSK 16 cine camera was mounted on the leading edge of the left wing

Variants and Development

With its advanced airframe and extensive electrical equipment, the Focke-Wulf 190 A-8/R2 was undoubtedly one of the Luftwaffe’s most modern interceptors. The formula it introduced for a powerfully armed and armored assault fighter would go on to enjoy a long career. In July 1944, Focke-Wulf presented several derivative projects, two of which reached the production stage.

Fw 190 A-8/R8: The airframe and performance were similar to the A-8/R2, but the MK 108 magazines were protected by three armor plates. A small series appears to have been built during the winter of 1944-45.

Fw 190 A-9: The result of adapting a BMW 801 TS/TH engine, which delivered 2,000 hp at takeoff, to the A-8 airframe. The leading edges of the wings were armored, and the original weapon configuration (two MG 131s and four MG 151s) was reinstated. Its performance far surpassed that of the A-8. This series began in October 1944 and gave rise to several subversions, including the A-9/R8 assault fighter, the A-9/R11 all-weather fighter, and a night fighter equipped with a FuG 216.